Post-Quantum Cryptography: A Starter Guide

Introduction

Imagine a future where an eavesdropper records your encrypted emails today, only to decrypt them effortlessly a few years down the line. This isn’t science fiction—it’s the looming reality posed by quantum computing. In simple terms, quantum computing is a new computing paradigm that uses quantum bits (qubits) which can exist in multiple states at once (like a coin standing on its edge, showing both heads and tails simultaneously). This phenomenon, known as superposition, allows quantum computers to perform many calculations in parallel, giving them the potential to solve certain problems exponentially faster than classical computers. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could, for example, factor large numbers or find discrete logarithms in a fraction of the time it would take a normal computer.

Why does this matter for cybersecurity? Today’s encryption schemes—like RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography—derive their security from the difficulty of specific math problems (factorization and discrete logarithms) that classical computers can’t solve in any reasonable timeframe. Quantum computers threaten to upend this balance. Shor’s algorithm, a quantum algorithm developed by mathematician Peter Shor, can factor large integers and break the mathematical foundations of RSA and ECC exponentially faster than the best classical algorithms. In practical terms, encryption that might take trillions of years to crack with classical computing could potentially be broken in hours or days with quantum computing. This “quantum leap” in computing power means that current cryptographic systems could become vulnerable, putting everything from online banking transactions to state secrets at risk.

The threat isn’t just theoretical or confined to academic discussion. Experts warn of a “harvest now, decrypt later” strategy where attackers steal or intercept encrypted data now, banking on the future availability of quantum computers to decrypt it later. In sectors like finance and healthcare that require data confidentiality for decades, this is a pressing concern. All experts surveyed in one recent report agreed that sufficiently advanced quantum attacks are likely within the next 15–30 years. Some have even dubbed this looming scenario the “quantum apocalypse”, referring to the potential mass breakage of encryption across the internet.

This is where post-quantum cryptography (PQC) comes in. PQC (also known as quantum-resistant or quantum-safe cryptography) refers to new encryption algorithms designed to be secure against quantum attacks and run on today’s classical computers. In other words, they rely on different hard math problems—ones that neither modern classical nor future quantum computers can easily solve. Adopting PQC is crucial to maintain trust in digital security in the quantum computing era, ensuring that businesses, governments, and individuals can keep communicating securely even once quantum computers become mainstream. In this article, we’ll explore how current cryptography works, why quantum computing is a threat, and how the cybersecurity world is preparing through post-quantum cryptography. We’ll cover the leading PQC algorithms emerging from the latest standards, the challenges of transitioning to these new tools, and what steps organizations can take right now to stay ahead of the quantum threat.

How Current Cryptography Works

Modern cryptography often relies on mathematical puzzles that are easy to create but extremely hard to solve without a secret key. A prime example is public-key cryptography, which underpins secure websites, online banking, encrypted email, and more. In a public-key system, there is a pair of keys: one public (shared openly) and one private (kept secret). These keys are mathematically linked such that data encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the private key. The security lies in one-way mathematical functions: it’s straightforward for computers to perform the encryption operation, but astronomically difficult to reverse it without the private key.

Two of the most widespread public-key schemes today are RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC):

• RSA (named after Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) bases its security on the difficulty of factoring large integers. The RSA public key is essentially a very large composite number (product of two primes). Breaking RSA means finding those two prime factors, which for a 2048-bit key is a task so hard that it would take classical computers far longer than the age of the universe to solve by brute force. This “factorization problem” is infeasible to solve with current technology, which is why RSA with sufficiently large keys is considered secure today.
• ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) and its variants like ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) rely on the difficulty of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Given a point on an elliptic curve that has been multiplied by some secret number, it’s computationally unfeasible for classical computers to figure out that secret number. Like RSA, ECC’s security comes from the lack of any efficient classical algorithm to solve that discrete log problem within a reasonable time frame.

Because of these hard math problems, current public-key cryptosystems are trusted. They’ve been mathematically and empirically vetted over decades. For instance, when you see the padlock icon in your web browser, it usually means a protocol like TLS is using RSA or ECC to exchange keys securely. The reason you can safely send your credit card number is that an eavesdropper would have to solve an almost impossible math problem (like factoring a 617-digit number) to decode the encrypted traffic.

It’s worth noting that symmetric cryptography (like AES encryption or SHA-256 hashing) works differently: it uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt, and its security is based on confusion and diffusion rather than one-way trapdoor functions. Symmetric algorithms are generally much faster and today are considered safe from all but brute-force attacks. They aren’t completely immune to quantum concerns (more on that later), but the good news is they can be made quantum-resistant relatively easily by using larger key sizes. Overall, the cryptography securing our data today—from public-key algorithms like RSA/ECC to symmetric ciphers like AES—relies on computational problems that today’s computers cannot solve in any reasonable amount of time.

The Quantum Threat

The security promises of RSA and ECC begin to crumble in the face of quantum computing. The core issue is that a quantum computer can process information in fundamentally different ways than a classical computer. Traditional computers evaluate possibilities one by one in sequence (or in parallel threads limited by their number of processors). Quantum computers, leveraging superposition and quantum entanglement, can evaluate many possibilities simultaneously. This capability is exploited by special quantum algorithms that dramatically reduce the time needed to solve certain problems that underlie modern cryptography.

The most dire threat comes from Shor’s algorithm. Shor’s algorithm, developed in 1994, showed that a quantum computer with enough qubits and low enough error rates could factor large numbers exponentially faster than any known classical algorithm. In essence, Shor’s algorithm would allow a quantum computer to derive an RSA private key from its public key (through prime factorization), or break an ECC key (through solving the discrete log problem), in a feasible amount of time. For perspective, a classical computer might require on the order of 2^100 steps (far more steps than there are atoms in the universe) to factor a 2048-bit RSA key, whereas a quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could theoretically do it in on the order of 2^30 steps or less – a difference that turns “forever” into perhaps a matter of hours. This is why experts say that Shor’s algorithm breaks the backbone of public-key cryptography: RSA, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, DSA, ECDSA, and other systems based on factoring or discrete log would no longer be secure.

Another quantum algorithm, known as Grover’s algorithm, poses a threat to symmetric cryptography and hashing, though it’s a more modest threat. Grover’s algorithm can quadratically speed up brute-force search. Practically, this means a quantum computer could find a secret key by trying possibilities in roughly √N steps instead of N. For a symmetric cipher like AES-128 (with 2^128 possible keys), Grover’s could reduce the effective security to about 2^64 operations. Fortunately, the countermeasure is simple: doubling key lengths. AES-256, for instance, would require about 2^128 quantum operations under Grover’s algorithm, which is considered out of reach. So while Grover’s algorithm suggests using longer keys (and hashing algorithms with larger output sizes), it doesn’t outright break symmetric crypto the way Shor’s devastates public-key crypto. In summary, quantum computers dramatically weaken symmetric encryption (needing larger keys) and outright collapse our current asymmetric encryption schemes.

So, when might this quantum threat materialize? The timeline is a subject of active debate. Current quantum prototypes (like those developed by IBM, Google, and others) have on the order of tens or hundreds of noisy qubits – impressive, but not enough to crack RSA-2048. Experts often refer to the moment when quantum computers can break our crypto as “Q-Day” or Y2Q (Year to Quantum). Predictions for Q-Day range from as early as the 2030s to a few decades out. A 2023 Global Risk Institute report found consensus that within the next 20–30 years we will likely have quantum computers capable of threatening classical encryption. On the other hand, uncertainty remains—scientific breakthroughs (or obstacles) could accelerate or delay the timeline.

Crucially, the uncertainty of “when” shouldn’t breed complacency. Data with long sensitivity lifespans (think health records, social security numbers, state secrets, intellectual property) is at risk today due to the “store now, decrypt later” tactic. Adversaries can steal encrypted data now and simply hold onto it. Years down the line, once they have access to a quantum computer, all that stolen ciphertext becomes plaintext treasure. This means that even if a quantum adversary won’t emerge until 2040, any sensitive information that must remain confidential until then (or beyond) needs protection against quantum attacks now. It’s a bit like knowing an earthquake will eventually hit a city—you’d strengthen the buildings before the quake strikes, not after. In the context of cybersecurity, strengthening our “cryptographic buildings” means moving to quantum-resistant solutions before Q-Day arrives.

Introduction to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)

So how do we protect our data against the quantum threat? One approach is to build quantum computers of our own and use quantum physics for defense (like quantum key distribution, which uses the laws of physics to detect eavesdropping). But quantum key distribution has practical limitations and requires new infrastructure. The more universally applicable solution is Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) – a suite of new quantum-resistant encryption algorithms that can run on classical computers but are designed to withstand attacks from quantum ones. The idea is straightforward: develop new mathematical problems for encryption that neither a quantum computer nor a classical computer can crack in any reasonable time frame.

What kind of math are these new algorithms based on, if not factoring or discrete logs? There are several hard problem families that researchers believe are resistant to known quantum algorithms:

• Lattice-Based Cryptography: Uses problems based on geometric structures called lattices (think of a grid of points in multi-dimensional space). A well-known hard lattice problem is the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) – finding the shortest non-zero vector in a huge grid is incredibly hard. CRYSTALS-Kyber (for encryption) and CRYSTALS-Dilithium (for digital signatures) are leading lattice-based schemes. Lattice approaches are currently very promising and three of the four NIST-selected algorithms are lattice-based.
• Hash-Based Signatures: These rely on the security of hash functions. Hashes like SHA-256 are believed to resist quantum attacks except for brute force (which Grover’s algorithm only weakens slightly). An example is SPHINCS+, a stateless hash-based signature scheme. It’s secure as long as the underlying hash function is secure, though signatures are larger and slower to generate.
• Code-Based Cryptography: Based on error-correcting codes. The classic example is the McEliece encryption scheme, which has survived decades of cryptanalysis. Its keys are very large, but it’s believed to be quantum-resistant.
• Multivariate Cryptography: Based on solving systems of multivariate quadratic equations (which is a hard problem). Example schemes include Rainbow (a signature scheme, though note that some multivariate candidates like Rainbow have been broken during the PQC evaluation process).
• Others: There are also exotic approaches like isogeny-based cryptography (e.g., SIKE) that saw some interest, though certain proposals were broken by classical cryptanalysis. The PQC field had many candidates, but intense public scrutiny in recent years has separated the wheat from the chaff.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been spearheading the effort to vet and standardize these quantum-resistant algorithms. In 2016, NIST launched an open competition calling on cryptographers worldwide to propose candidate post-quantum algorithms. After multiple evaluation rounds, NIST announced in July 2022 the first group of winners to be standardized for broad use. These are the algorithms that will form the core of our quantum-safe toolbox:

• CRYSTALS-Kyber – Key Encapsulation Mechanism (Encryption): Kyber is a lattice-based encryption scheme designed for securing two-party communications (for example, establishing a shared secret over the internet). It was chosen for its strong security and also for its efficiency – it has relatively small keys and ciphertexts compared to other PQC candidates, making it practical to use in protocols like TLS. Kyber will essentially play the role for PQC that RSA/ECC key exchange plays today, enabling things like quantum-safe HTTPS.
• CRYSTALS-Dilithium – Digital Signatures: Dilithium, related to Kyber (hence the shared "CRYSTALS" name), is a lattice-based signature scheme. It was praised for its high efficiency and strong security proofs, and NIST recommends Dilithium as the primary general-purpose quantum-safe signature algorithm. We might one day use Dilithium wherever we currently use RSA or ECDSA signatures – from code signing to digital certificates – to ensure authenticity in a quantum world.
• FALCON – Digital Signatures: FALCON is another lattice-based signature scheme that was standardized alongside Dilithium. It has the advantage of smaller signature sizes. NIST selected FALCON mainly for applications that require more compact signatures than Dilithium can provide. This gives organizations options: Dilithium for general use and FALCON for specialized cases (like certain IoT devices or systems with strict bandwidth limits).
• SPHINCS+ – Digital Signatures: Unlike the others, SPHINCS+ is not lattice-based; it’s a stateless hash-based signature scheme. It’s significantly slower and produces larger signatures, but it serves as an important hedge against any unforeseen weaknesses in lattice-based math. Since SPHINCS+ is based on hashes, its security rests on very well-tested primitives (hash functions). NIST included it to ensure diversity in our defenses – if one approach falters, another remains.

These four algorithms (one for encryption/key-establishment, three for signatures) are the vanguard of post-quantum cryptography, slated to be standardized and rolled out in the coming years. It’s worth noting that ongoing research continues for other candidates (NIST is considering additional algorithms for standardization to cover more use-cases or to have backups). But Kyber, Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+ are the names you’ll be hearing a lot as the world starts adopting PQC. Each is built on math problems believed to resist quantum attacks and decades of classical attacks, but they also come with new considerations – like larger key sizes or signature sizes – which leads to the next topic: the challenges of transitioning to these new cryptosystems.

Challenges in Transitioning to PQC

Adopting post-quantum cryptography across our digital infrastructure is not as simple as flipping a switch. There are significant challenges in transitioning from our tried-and-true algorithms to the new quantum-resistant ones. Here are some of the key hurdles:

• Performance and Size Overheads: PQC algorithms, especially lattice-based ones, tend to have larger key and message sizes than the algorithms they would replace. For example, a Kyber public key (for encryption) is a few kilobytes in size, whereas an RSA-2048 public key is only 256 bytes. Likewise, Dilithium signatures are larger than ECDSA signatures. These bigger keys and outputs can slow down networks and require more storage and bandwidth. Moreover, the computations themselves (though efficient in relative terms) can be more intensive. As a result, encryption and decryption might take longer and use more CPU, especially on smaller devices. In short, “key and ciphertext sizes are larger, and encryption/decryption times are longer”, which can impact performance and even require changes to protocols and software. Systems that perform a lot of cryptographic operations per second (like secure web servers handling thousands of handshakes) might need optimization or beefier hardware to handle PQC’s extra load.
• Integration and Compatibility: Our current security protocols (TLS, IPsec, SSH, etc.) and software libraries have been built around RSA/ECC for decades. PQC algorithms are not always “drop-in” replacements. For instance, some network protocols assume certain message size limits or specific behaviors that PQC might not meet without modifications. There’s a need to update standards (like TLS 1.3, X.509 certificates, etc.) to support larger keys and new algorithm identifiers. No drop-in alternatives exist for some uses of current algorithms, meaning we must carefully retrofit or redesign parts of our security infrastructure. Ensuring compatibility while upgrading millions of devices (from browsers to IoT gadgets) is a non-trivial task.
• Maturity and Trust: RSA has been around since 1977, ECC since the 1980s/90s; we have immense experience and confidence in their security (under classical assumptions). The new PQC algorithms, in contrast, are relatively young. While they’ve undergone rigorous analysis (the NIST process was very open and drew worldwide scrutiny), it’s possible that implementation bugs or even unforeseen weaknesses could surface over time. Organizations may be hesitant to deploy brand-new crypto broadly without extensive testing. It’s a Catch-22: we won’t gain full confidence until they’re widely used, but some are nervous to be early adopters. This is why NIST and experts often recommend a hybrid approach initially – using both a classical and a post-quantum algorithm in parallel (for example, doing a TLS handshake that generates two keys: one via ECDH and one via Kyber) to hedge bets during the transition period.
• Existing Systems and “Cryptographic Debt”: Enterprises often don’t have a clear inventory of everywhere cryptography is used in their systems. Old protocols, custom applications, embedded devices in the field – many might be running RSA/ECC under the hood. Upgrading these can be very challenging, especially if devices are constrained (think of a smart card or a tiny IoT sensor) or if they are no longer supported. This legacy crypto, sometimes called cryptographic technical debt, needs to be identified and addressed. A big challenge is simply organizational awareness: many companies “don’t know how their cryptography works, where keys and algorithms are used, or how secrets are stored”. You can’t fix what you can’t see.
• Operational and Organizational Challenges: Aside from the technical aspects, there’s the need for skills and planning. Cryptography experts are a rare breed, and now organizations need them to chart a course to PQC. There’s also vendor support: companies rely on hardware and software vendors for security solutions, and not all vendors are moving at the same pace. Gartner analysts warn not to assume vendors are prepared; many are “unprepared to upgrade and may not recognize the need unless pushed”. This means customers (e.g., businesses and government agencies) might have to demand PQC support and work closely with vendors to implement it.

In summary, the transition to post-quantum cryptography involves trade-offs and careful planning. We need to upgrade everything from internet protocols to hardware chips, all while maintaining security during the changeover. Testing and standardization efforts are ongoing to smooth this process. The good news is that awareness is growing, and there are already frameworks and pilot programs to integrate PQC (for instance, Open Quantum Safe (OQS) is an open-source project helping software libraries add PQC algorithms). It’s a bit like renovating a house’s foundation while still living in it – tricky, but doable with the right approach. The next section looks at how various industries and governments are handling this and what the roadmap might look like.

Real-World Applications & Future Outlook

The impact of quantum computing will not be uniform across all sectors – some industries are at higher risk and thus leading the charge in adopting post-quantum cryptography. Based on analyses by cybersecurity experts, industries likely to be targeted first by quantum-enabled attackers include finance, energy, health care, and government (What C-suite must know about post-quantum cryptography | EY - US). It makes sense: banks and financial institutions rely heavily on cryptography for transactions and blockchain systems; energy and utilities are part of critical infrastructure (where a breach could be devastating); healthcare organizations store sensitive personal data that needs long-term privacy; and governments have classified information and communications that adversaries would love to unlock. These sectors are already initiating quantum-risk assessments and starting to trial PQC in their high-security systems. For example, some banks have begun testing PQC algorithms for inter-bank communications, and government agencies are mapping out which of their systems use vulnerable cryptography.

On the company front, tech giants and cybersecurity firms are actively working on PQC adoption. Companies like IBM, Google, and Microsoft are not only developing quantum computers but also contributing to PQC research (IBM and Google have both participated in NIST’s process and in open-source PQC libraries). Cloudflare and other internet infrastructure firms have run experimental deployments of PQC algorithms in protocols like TLS to gauge performance and compatibility in real-world conditions. Browser makers and standards bodies are also involved: for instance, Google’s Chrome and Firefox have tested hybrid post-quantum key exchange in experimental modes (combining classical and PQC algorithms in TLS handshakes). This real-world testing is crucial to uncover practical issues and build confidence.

Governments across the globe are taking the quantum threat seriously as well, often issuing directives and investing in research:

• In the United States, a National Security Memorandum in 2022 (NSM-10) set the stage for a transition to quantum-resistant cryptography, mandating that federal agencies inventory their cryptographic systems and be ready to switch to approved PQC when standards are finalized. The U.S. has set a goal for its federal agencies (especially those handling national security) to implement quantum-safe encryption by 2035, with interim deadlines for progress along the way. Legislation like the Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act (enacted in late 2022) also pushes agencies to start planning for PQC.
• Europe and other regions have similar initiatives. For instance, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has a working group on quantum-safe cryptography, and many European countries have national programs to fund PQC research. China has heavily funded quantum computing research and is likely simultaneously working on quantum-proofing its own communications.
• International collaborations are underway. Standards bodies, academic researchers, and industry consortia (like the PQC Alliance under the Linux Foundation) are sharing knowledge to ensure the new cryptographic solutions are robust and can be adopted globally.

Looking ahead 10–20 years, what can we expect? If all goes well, by the mid-2030s quantum-resistant encryption should be the norm for new systems. In fact, if you buy a new smartphone or laptop in, say, 2030, it might come with quantum-safe protocols baked into its operating system and hardware security module. Critical internet protocols will likely have been upgraded (a future TLS 1.4 might only allow PQC algorithms, for instance). We may also see dual-use periods wherein both classical and PQC algorithms run side by side for added safety during a transitional phase. Over time, as confidence grows, the old algorithms like RSA and ECC will be phased out – perhaps disabled by default in software libraries or even legally required to be replaced in certain industries (much like how old, weak encryption standards are deprecated today).

In terms of threat landscape, as quantum technology matures, it’s possible new threats or refined algorithms will emerge. Security professionals will need to stay agile. There’s also the chance that new quantum algorithms could threaten some PQC approaches (though none are known yet); this is why diversity (like including hash-based and code-based options) remains important. On the optimistic side, if we transition in time, the “Quantum Apocalypse” might be a non-event: come Q-Day, adversaries find that most valuable data is already protected by quantum-resistant crypto, rendering their shiny new quantum computer much less effective for cyberattacks. Achieving that outcome requires significant effort in the coming decade, but the consensus is that the effort is not just worthwhile, it’s absolutely necessary.

Conclusion

The era of quantum computing is approaching, and with it comes both incredible opportunities and formidable challenges for cybersecurity. Post-quantum cryptography is our proactive answer to the question: How do we keep information secure when computers get exponentially more powerful? The writing is on the wall for RSA, ECC, and other staples of encryption – they won’t withstand the test of quantum time. Businesses, governments, and security professionals cannot afford to take a “wait and see” approach. Preparing now is the prudent strategy to avoid being caught off-guard by the quantum breakthrough that could render today’s protections obsolete.

The good news is that the world is not standing still. Thanks to initiatives by NIST and global cryptographers, we already have candidate quantum-resistant algorithms and draft standards in hand. But transitioning to these new standards will take years of careful work. Every organization should start laying the groundwork today. Here are some concrete steps and call-to-action recommendations for entities large and small:

1. Educate and Raise Awareness – Ensure that decision makers and technical teams in your organization understand the quantum threat. Quantum computing shouldn’t be seen as esoteric science relevant only to physicists; it has clear business and security implications. Training sessions or invited talks on quantum risk can help build internal knowledge.
2. Cryptographic Inventory – Conduct a thorough audit of where and how your systems use cryptography. Identify all applications, devices, and services that rely on public-key cryptography (TLS certificates, VPNs, code signing, etc.). This inventory is crucial to scope the impact of migrating to PQC and to prioritize which systems need updates first.
3. Engage with Vendors and Partners – Talk to your software, hardware, and cloud providers about their quantum-resistant encryption roadmap. Push for timelines on support for PQC in their products. When procuring new technology, include PQC readiness as a consideration. Collaboration is key: industry groups and standards bodies often welcome participation in pilot programs or feedback – consider getting involved.
4. Experiment and Implement in Phases – Start testing post-quantum algorithms in non-production or low-risk environments. For example, enable optional quantum-safe cipher suites in your web servers and see how it impacts performance. Some organizations are already experimenting with hybrid encryption in their communications. These trials will uncover practical issues early and help your IT teams gain experience with PQC implementations.
5. Plan for Crypto-Agility – Crypto-agility is the ability to swap out cryptographic algorithms with minimal disruption. If your systems are designed to be crypto-agile, you can more smoothly transition to PQC (and to whatever comes next beyond that). This might mean refactoring code to use centralized crypto libraries (so updates happen in one place), avoiding hard-coding specific algorithms, and ensuring update mechanisms are robust. In essence, build flexibility so that as standards evolve (which they will), you can adapt quickly.
6. Follow Standards and Guidance – Keep an eye on NIST’s announcements and guidance on post-quantum cryptography, as well as your national cybersecurity agencies’ recommendations. NIST, for instance, suggests not “baking in” any single PQC algorithm too permanently just yet (since the standards were still being finalized) but rather to prepare by developing migration plans and policies. Leverage resources like NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence projects on PQC migration, which provide templates and best practices for transitioning.
7. Prioritize Long-Term Security – Identify data that must remain secure for years to come. For any sensitive information with a long shelf life, consider re-encrypting it with quantum-resistant algorithms sooner rather than later (or at least doubling up encryption with a PQC algorithm alongside the classical one). This mitigates the risk of “steal now, decrypt later” interceptions on critical data.

In conclusion, the advent of quantum computing will be a pivotal moment for information security. It’s often compared to a Y2K-like event for encryption, but unlike Y2K, we don’t have a fixed deadline — the challenge could materialize at any time in the coming decades. This uncertainty actually means we must be more proactive. Post-quantum cryptography provides the toolkit we need to defend against the quantum threat, but it requires action today to implement in time. By staying informed, participating in the adoption of new standards, and beginning the transition process now, organizations can ensure that their secure communications and data remain secure in the quantum era. The quantum computing revolution doesn’t have to spark chaos in cybersecurity; with preparation and the robust new algorithms at our disposal, we can face the future with confidence, knowing our cryptography is ready for whatever computing power comes next.

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